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Introduction 
September 11, 2001 was a catastrophic day. Americans all across the nation watched 
as jet liners crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, into 
the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and into a field in rural Pennsylvania. Fear gripped the 
nation as the major newscasters continuously aired the Twin Towers collapsing to the ground 
and the Pentagon burning. The public looked to their government for assurance and safety; 
President George W. Bush, the Commander in Chief of the United States, became the 
national spokesperson. Before September 11, the Gallup Poll reported that President Bush 
had an approval rating of 51 %. President Bush's approval rating increased to 90% a week 
after the attacks. The outpouring of public support for President Bush following the attacks is 
one illustration of how the American public tends to unite behind their leader after a 
devastating national event. 
The public's tendency to support the president following a crisis has been termed by 
John Mueller as the "rally 'round the flag" effect (1970). The public's predisposition to 
support the president following a dramatic and major event directly involving the United 
States is a widely recognized and studied effect in American politics. Scholars often use 
presidential approval ratings gathered by the Gallup Poll and other similar polls to study 
rallies. However, these polling devices solely measure the opinion of the general public, or as 
mass opinion presidential approval ratings. The polls do not measure the presidential 
approval rating amongst members of Congress, or elite opinion presidential approval ratings. 
Likewise, while much scholarly literature on the "rally 'round the flag" effect addresses mass 
opinion rallies, only a fraction of it addresses elite opinion rallies. 
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Although rallies in Congress are an underdeveloped study topic, numerous scholars 
have examined and researched the relationship between the executive and legislative 
branches of government more broadly, and have established important correlations between 
the two. Richard Neustadt, a well-established executive and legislative scholar, identifies a 
correlation between a president's success in Congress and a president's public approval 
rating (1960). While Neustadt's research does not directly acknowledge that Congress tends 
to increase their support of the president after a crisis event, it may imply that a mass opinion 
rally will increase the president's chances of success in Congress. This is measured by the 
congruent congressional votes to the president's position on a particular policy. Since both 
the executive and the legislative branches are necessary for enacting and affecting change 
and reform, scholars like Neustadt (1960), Arnold (1990), Peterson (1990), and Barrett and 
Eshbaugh-Soha (2007) arduously attempt to comprehend how the president is able to 
influence and gain support in Congress. 
Measuring and explaining elite opinion support levels of a president after a crisis 
event are important in understanding the nature of the executive-legislative branch 
interaction over time and under particular conditions. If a rally does in fact occur in Congress, 
the president may experience a span of increased influence where more members of Congress 
are less likely to disagree with his policies. A president may be more likely to push his 
agenda through a Congress with high presidential approval ratings, even if only temporarily. 
Rallies may be unique windows of opportunities for presidents to quickly introduce and pass 
laws. A president is more likely to achieve policy success with a favorable elite opinion. 
Studies that examine the behavior of Congress during a rally have the potential to 
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demonstrate that rallies affect elite opinion and that the president does have a temporary 
allotment of time where his policies have a higher probability of approval. 
This study focuses on addressing the question on whether the rallies which Mueller 
identifies as affecting mass opinion also affect elite opinion. The study will examine the 
changes in President Bush's support levels within the 1 07th Congress following the terrorist 
attacks of September 11; the study will only examine the House of Representatives during 
the 1 Oih Congress. September 11 is a unique case as the public rally is unparalleled in size 
and is not representative of any previously measured rally. Nonetheless, September 11 is 
potentially not an anomaly amongst rallies; future rallies have the capability to be 
comparable in magnitude. The September 11 rally demonstrates that not all rallies share the 
same length or intensity and that rallies may not be as temporary as scholars have noted 
(Brody 1991; Meernik and Waterman 1996). The September 11 rally may be useful to make 
generalizations about future large-scale attacks, such as those using weapons of mass 
destruction. September 11 is the case of this study in order to extend the research on both 
rallies and the executive-legislative relationship. 
The following sections examine the rally effect in the House of Representatives 
following a crisis. The first section combines the literature on rallies with the literature on 
the impact of presidential popularity on presidential influence in the House to develop new 
testable hypotheses on the effect that a rally should have on presidential success in the House. 
This section also combines the literature on rallies with the impact of congressional 
subgroups on elite opinion to develop hypotheses on the subgroups that should be more 
inclined to change their level of support following a crisis event. The second section 
addresses the methodology of the study, laying out the basic definitions and analytical 
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approach. The third section will test the hypotheses using statistical analyses. The fourth and 
final section imparts the conclusions of the study, along with possible explanations and 
additional questions for future research. 
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Literature Review 
The "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon is first attributed to John E. Mueller. Mueller 
(1970) finds that international crises generate a "rally 'round the flag" effect, whereby the 
president receives a sudden and temporary boost in his popularity. Mueller defines a "rally 
'round the flag" effect to be a response to a crisis that is international in nature, that involves 
the United States and the president directly, and that it is specific, dramatic, and sharply 
focused. Mueller finds that the president experiences a sudden increase in popularity 
following such an event. He theorizes that the public rallies behind the president in fear that 
a disunited public will convey weakness to other international actors, which could endanger 
the nation's chances of success. In turn, the public will support the president, despite the 
merits of his policies (Polsby 1964). Mueller uses a specific question through the Gallup poll, 
which asks whether the public approves of the way that the president is handling his job in 
order to measure presidential approval. Although there were scholars before Mueller who 
found a correlation between mass opinion and a crisis (Waltz 1967; Wicker 1967), Mueller 
was the first to define and extensively study the rally effect. 
Two schools of thought have emerged since Mueller's original theories published in 
1970 that indentify the principal causes of the rally effect: the patriotism school of thought 
and the opinion leadership school of thought. The patriotism school of thought first identifies 
patriotism to be the leading reason of a rally (Mueller 1970; Parker 1995). The president 
symbolizes national unity and power, naturally causing the public to rally behind him in a 
unified and uncritical manner. However, patriotism is both difficult to define and difficult to 
measure. Thus while the patriotism school of thought might be the reason for a rally effect, 
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the lack of definite forms of measurement compels scholars to search for more explicable 
causes of rallies. The scholars who form the second school of thought hold that opinion 
leadership is a primary contributor to a rally phenomenon. Brody (1991) and Zaller ( 1991 ) 
claim that the absence of criticism from opinion leaders is mirrored in the media, which 
positively reflects on the mass opinion's approval of the president. In separate studies, Brody 
and Zaller both find that during rallies, opposition leaders refrain from comment altogether 
or attempt to issue only cautiously supportive statements. 
Despite the clash between the approaches, patriotism may play a role in the reasoning 
of both. A possible explanation of why opposition leaders refrain from negative comment is 
that they want to appear patriotic at a moment when the American public rallies behind the 
president with a common sentiment. If true, patriotism strongly affects the leadership opinion 
school of thought. 
Hetherington and Nelson (2003) affirm the role of patriotism in the two schools of 
thought by suggesting that the constitutional design of the presidency creates a surge of 
patriotism in the development of a rally, resulting in the tendency for opinion leaders to 
refrain from negative comment. Hetherington and Nelson attribute the opinion leadership 
school of thought to the duration of a rally. The Constitution divides the government into 
three branches: the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. One individual controls the 
executive branch, whereas multiple individuals control the legislative and judicial branches. 
As the sole individual over the executive branch, the president has the unique ability to act as 
the nation's spokesperson. The nation automatically looks to the only identifiable national 
spokesperson in times when unified leadership is needed; this occurrence is witnessed at the 
start of a presidential term, or the "honeymoon period." Mueller (1973) finds that the 
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president receives a rally in the onset of a new term, as the term once again unifies the nation 
behind their chief of state. Pfiffner (1988), Lockerbie, Borelli, and Hedger (1998), and 
Barrett and Eshbaugh-Soha (2007) likewise suggest that presidents tend to achieve their 
highest rates of legislative success during their honeymoon period, when they are in the good 
graces of the public. The passage of time and occurrence of polarizing events lessen the level 
of public unification and create a less enthusiastic evaluation of the president, which might 
indicate that the president's time in office is tied to the intensity of a rally. In addition, a 
decrease in presidential approval from the public shapes the willingness of opposition leaders 
and the media to criticize the president, which also may determine the intensity of a rally 
(Brody 1991). 
At this point, it is important to mention a study by Edwards and Swenson (1976) on 
who rallies. The scholarly literature on the two schools of thought suggests the principal 
causes behind the rally, but the literature does not address the question of who rallies. 
Edwards and Swenson find that those who are most disposed to support the president are 
more likely to rally. However, their study solely examines mass opinion and does not 
examine elite opinion. Further examination of the literature on rallies at the elite level and 
this study may determine whether Edwards and Swenson's finding apply in Congress. 
To continue, Brody's (1991) research concerning the lack of criticism from 
opposition leaders during a rally comes from an extensive array of studies on presidential 
support at the elite decision making level; numerous scholars have examined the relationship 
between the executive and legislative branch. In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt (1960) 
finds that the President's public prestige is an important source of influence on Congress. 
Although Neustadt only uses limited examples that may make his work non-generalizable, 
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further research by Edwards (1976), Crespi (1980), and Rivers and Rose (1985) find that as 
presidents experience mass opinion support, they encounter less resistance and less criticism 
from Congress. 
Edwards' (1976) study about the relationship between presidential popularity and 
overall presidential support in the House of Representatives examines the level of support 
within congressional subgroups. He investigates congressional support for the president 
based on a member's partisanship, seniority, and seat marginality. Freshmen members and 
members from marginal seats are more positively correlated with presidential support than 
non-freshman members and members from safe seats. 
Bond and Fleisher (1980) extend Edward's study of the subgroups within the House 
and Senate by identifying ideology as an important determinant of presidential support on 
congressional roll call votes. They find that the president's popularity has a positive impact 
on support from members of his party, but it has a negative impact on support from members 
of the opposition. Therefore, even though the president's public prestige enhances his 
support within Congress, the measure of this support varies across the different subgroups 
within Congress. 
Although a positive correlation between presidential prestige and congressional 
support exists, the correlation is limited (Meernik 1993). Bond and Fleisher (1984) find that 
the president's mass opinion levels affects his congressional success as it influences the 
number of members elected to Congress from the president's party. Additional research 
concurrently shows that voters' evaluations of the president affect the re-election chances of 
members of his party in Congress (Tufte 1975; Pierson 1975; Kernell 1977). These findings 
suggest that a president's ability to alter the voting behavior of members of Congress is 
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limited and further promotes the importance of subgroups in determining the president's 
support in Congress. 
The literature cited thus far has not measured the correlation between elite opinion 
and presidential support levels during rallies. Rohde ( 1991 ), Hristoulas (2000), and Baker 
and Oneal (2001) all find that Mueller's (1970) theory on rallies applies at the elite level, 
meaning that the levels of support in Congress parallel the surges in public approval. 
Additionally, Fleisher and Bond (1988) find that Republican presidents experience 
remarkably higher elite opinion support levels from liberal Democrats in Congress. Baum 
(2002) similarly finds that Republican presidents, more so than their Democratic counterparts, 
experience significantly larger rallies in Congress, especially if Democrats control Congress. 
This literature suggests that Mueller's "rally 'round the flag" phenomenon does occur at the 
However, there is little literature analyzing presidential support within other 
congressional subgroups during a rally. This study will analyze if the conclusions from the 
literature concerning presidential support in Congress during normal times are applicable 
during rallies on the House of Representatives. Edwards (1976), and Bond and Fleisher 
(1980) identify party, seniority, seat marginality, and ideology to have identifiable impacts 
on presidential support on elite opinion. Although other subgroups may have an impact on 
presidential support on elite opinion, this study will only examine the four subgroups 
identified by Edwards, and Bond and Fleisher. 
This study accepts Mueller's (1970) theory about the rally effect that predicts and 
explains a surge of presidential popularity that occurs in response to a crisis. This study also 
accepts Edwards (1976) findings that presidential prestige positively influences the 
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president's level of support within the House of Representatives. These studies will extend 
Mueller's and Edwards's studies by examining presidential support levels in the House after 
a crisis event. 
Given the suggestions and findings reviewed here, this study draws upon the literature 
that crisis events provoke mass opinion support levels for the president and the literature on 
the positive impact of presidential popularity on a president's influence in Congress, and tests 
the hypothesis that the House of Representatives rallies behind the president following a crisis 
event. This study also merges the literature on the rally effect with the literature on the 
impact of congressional subgroups on elite opinion to hypothesize that particular subgroups 
are more likely to rally than other subgroups. The subsequent sections lay out the 
methodology, the tested hypotheses, and the analyzed results. 
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Methodology 
In order to test the assumptions that the House of Representatives rallies and that 
particular subgroups are more likely to rally, I focused on the House during the 1 07th 
Congress. Due to time and resource restraints, I chose to study only one crisis event, and 
September 11, 2001 provided a "natural experiment" for testing rally events since the 
terrorist attacks occurred towards the middle of the two year session of the Hous~ of 
Representatives. For this reason, I only focused on the House; the Senate was not examined 
in this study. The dates of recorded votes examined from the 1 Oih Congress span from 
January 3, 2001 to November 15, 2002. 
The data used to test my assumptions were from Keith Poole's 107th House Roll Call 
Data. 1 The original data set entailed the voting record of every (voting) House member on 
each recorded vote. The data set included an entry for each member, the position each 
member took on each vote, along with their basic information including state, district, and 
party affiliation. In addition to the voting record of each House member, the original data 
included President Bush's position for each recorded vote. However, in order to measure 
presidential support levels, the data needed to be augmented to reflect whether the member's 
votes were aligned with or in opposition to the President's position. 
This study uses Edwards' (1976) measurement of presidential support in order to test 
the assumptions. This measurement depends on calculations of individual levels of support 
based on voting record; in other words, whether they voted in favor of the president's 
position. The data was narrowed to include only the recorded roll call votes on which 
1 Poole, Keith. "lOih House Roll Call Data." Voteview Website. http://voteview.com/house107.htm 
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President Bush took a position. Out of the 990 roll call votes from Keith Poole's original data, 
the 72 roll call votes on which President Bush took a position were selected. The data set I 
constructed therefore included the voting record of each House member, yielding a total of 
72 cases. 
This new data was sufficient to test the assumption that a rally did occur in the House 
of Representatives. However, it was insufficient to test the assumptions on the increase 
likelihood of particular subgroups to rally. The data was further expanded to include relevant 
personal background characteristics of each House member: seniority, seat marginality, and 
ideology. 
Seniority was determined by the number of terms a member has served in office: 
freshmen members are classified to have less than one term in office and non-freshmen 
members are classified to have one or more terms in office (Edwards 1976). Seat marginality 
refers to the security of a member's seat. The distinction between marginal seats and non-
marginal seats is determined on the winning percentages from a member's previous election. 
Members achieving 60% of more of the vote are classified as non-marginal and members 
with less than 60% ofthe vote are classified as marginal (Gross and Garand 1984). This 
study uses Keith Poole's W-Nominate scores on ideology to divide members into three sets: 
conservative, moderate, and liberal (Bond and Fleisher 1980). Keith Poole locates Congress 
members on an ideological scale that ranges from + 1 to -1, with + 1 being the most 
conservative and -1 being the most liberal. Members with a range from .33 to +1 were 
classified as conservative, members with a range from -1 to -.33 were classified as liberal, 
and all members with a range between -.32 and .32 were classified as moderate. 
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Table 1 shows the overall number of House of Representatives who served the 1 Oih 
Congress, along with the percentages and total number of House members classified for each 
subgroup. Out of the four subgroups, Democrats and Republicans are split the most evenly 
with Democrats having a slight majority of 2.8%. The seniority and seat marginality 
subgroups are split less evenly with non-freshmen members having 75 .6% majority over 
freshmen members and non-marginal seat members having a 50.4% majority over marginal 
seat members. For the ideological subgroups, conservative members have the majority with 
46.2%, followed by moderate members with 36.5%, and then liberal members with 17.3%. 
Table 1. Composition of the House of Representatives during the 107th Congress by 
Subgroup and Overall 
Subgroup Total number Percentage 
Party Democrat 228 51.4% 
Republican 216 48.6% 
Seniority Freshmen 54 12.2% 
Non-freshmen 390 87.8% 
Seat marginality Marginal seat 110 24.8% 
Nan-marginal seat 334 75.2% 
Ideology Conservative 205 46.2% 
Moderate 162 36.5% 
Liberal 77 17.3% 
Total Overall 444 100.0% 
- --
Table 1 also shows that there were 444 overall number of House members in the data 
set. However, the House is only supposed to be comprised of 43 5 members. This 
inconsistency is due to changes of membership throughout the 1 Oih Congress. In total, there 
were eleven changes, but only nine actual changes of membership, accounting for the 
inconsistency. 2 
2 Jim Traficant of the l71h district of Ohio was expelled and Tony P. Hall of the 3'd district of Ohio was 
expelled; their seats remained vacant for the remainder of the session. 
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The final data set included the voting behavior of 444 members for 72 roll call votes. 
However, there are limitations to this data. Firstly, the data only examines one case event 
during one congressional session. Secondly, the data only examine select roll call votes from 
the House during the 1 Oih Congress. President Bush took positions on a small sample 
number of votes during the 1 oih Congress, creating sample restrictions. Lastly, only four 
subgroups are examined, although additional subgroups may potentially be more inclined to 
rally; I focused on these four because the literature suggests that they are the variables most 
likely to matter in the rally effect. Despite these limitations, this study will extend the 
research on the executive-legislative relationship following a crisis. 
The study used two forms of analysis to test the final data and to examine presidential 
support levels in the House of Representatives. Before the analyses, bar graphs are employed 
to show the aggregate percentage of presidential support both before and after September 11, 
along with the difference in support levels. The first analysis on the data was the t-test. The t-
test analyses show the difference in voting percentages represented in the bar graph, but it 
determines whether there is enough of a statistical relationship between the data being 
analyzed and the corresponding level of support to be statistically significant. The second 
form of analysis was a multivariate regression. This statistical test allows for the 
simultaneous testing of each variable controlling for the effects of the other variables. The 
following section analyzes presidential support levels in the House of Representatives in the 
aftermath of September 11 using these three forms of analysis. 
16 
( 
Statistical Results 
Overall Support 
The assumption from the scholarly literature suggests that Congress may rally behind 
the president after a crisis event. More specifically, the analysis will examine if President 
Bush received an increase in support levels from the House of Representatives during the 
1 oih Congress. The hypothesis is the following: 
H 1 : Presidential support amongst members of Congress increases following a crisis 
event. 
When comparing the aggregate percent of support for President Bush before and after 
September 11, the results show that support levels did increase. From the start of the 1 Oih 
Congress on January 3, 2001 to September 11, 2001, President Bush had a 56.3% overall 
support rate in the House ofRepresentatives. From September 11, 2001 to the end ofthe 
10ih Congress on November 15, 2002, President Bush had a 63.7% overall support rate after 
September 11. Figure 1 displays these percentages. The difference of overall support 
between pre-September 11 and post-September 11 was 7 .4%. The bar graph shown in Figure 
1 supports the hypothesis that there was a general increase in presidential support within the 
House after the September 11 attacks. 
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Though Figure 1 shows that there was in fact an increase in presidential support, it 
does not show whether the increase, which was relatively small, did not occur randomly. To 
further investigate whether the observed difference actually exists in the tested population, a 
t-test was performed on the data, where the results can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2. T -test: President Bush's Support Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
90% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
Sig. 
(2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Supported 5.326 .024 
Equal - 67.448 .096 -7.4125000 4.3968140 -14.7 453342 -.0796658 
variances 1.686 
not 
assumed 
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This t-test uses a difference in means test to determine the statistical significance of 
the results shown in Table 2. The t-test identifies a specific variable as a predictor and 
examines the effect that the predictor has on a specific response. In this case, the response 
being examined is the elite opinion level of presidential support and the predictors are 
whether the votes occurred before or after September 11 . 
The t-test in Table 2 yields inconclusive results.3 There is a one-in-ten chance or 
greater that these results occurred randomly, as the significance level is .096, well above the 
standard 95% level of confidence. While the t-test does not lead to an outright rejection of 
H 1, it does not strongly support it either. Despite the inconclusive results on overall support 
from the t-test, overall president support levels in the House did increase following 
September 11. This increase suggests that a conclusive rally may have occurred in 
congressional subgroups, if not in the overall House. The following analyses will examine 
whether rallies conclusively occurred in four congressional subgroups: party affiliation, 
seniority, seat marginality, and ideology. 
Support by Party Affiliation 
Partisanship establishes critical subgroups within Congress; a members' identifiable 
party may affect that members voting choices (Bond, Fleisher, and Wood 2003). This study 
accepts that party affiliation may play a dominant role in determining the elite's presidential 
support levels. Fleisher and Bond (1988) suggest that rallies in Congress are party specific. 
They find that Republican presidents experience higher levels of support during rallies from 
3 The value in the column labels "sig." is known as the p-value. The p-value represents the level of error 
within the specified confidence interval for the analysis. The 90% confidence level is not considered a strong 
correlation; a strong correlation would need to be significant within a 95% confidence level. 
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liberal Democrats. Baum (2003) similarly suggests that Republican presidents experience 
larger rallies with a Democratic-controlled Congress. Since the case in this study involves a 
Republican president and a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives, this study tests 
Fleisher and Bond's, and Baum's findings that Democrats increasingly support a Republican 
president after a crisis; the hypothesis for party affiliation is the following: 
H2: Democratic House members' levels of support for a Republican president are 
more likely to increase than Republican House members' levels of support following 
a crisis event. 
Using the data on party affiliation, the results show that President Bush received an 
84.2% support rate from Republican members and a 25.3% support rate from Democratic 
members before September 11. After September 11, he received an 87.1% support rate from 
Republican members and a 39.4% support rate from Democratic members. 
Republicans tended to have higher support rates for President Bush throughout the 
House of Representatives during the 10ih Congress than Democrats. However, Figure 2 
displays that the difference in support from pre-September 11 and post-September 11 by 
party were higher in Democrats than in Republicans: Democrats increased their support by 
14.1 %, whereas the Republicans only increased their support by 2.9%. 
20 
---·-~-~-----··-· - - ---· -------·- ··,.---· ···--- ·--~ 
Figure 2. Presidential Rally by Party Following 
9/11 
14.1 
2..9 • Difference In Support 
RepubHcan Demon at 
Party 
i 
Figure 2 shows that there is a large difference in support for President Bush based on 
the partisanship of House members, indicating that they were affected differently by the rally 
effect. At-test was employed in order to examine the statistical significance of these results. 
In this analysis, the predictor is the party affiliation ofthe House members and the response 
is the difference in voting before and after September 11. The results of the t-test can be seen 
below in Table 3. 
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Table 3. T -test: President Bush's Support Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 by Party 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Sig. 
(2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
difference 5.921 .015 
of before Equal 10.460 378.495 .000 12.48991 1.19404 10.14213 14.83770 
and after variances 
not 
assumed 
These results show a strong statistical significance from the bar graph in Figure 2 that 
supports H2.4 With a significance level of p<.001, there is a strong level of correlation 
between party affiliation and the amount of change of presidential support in the House of 
Representatives after September 11. 
Analyzing the difference in support for the president between Republicans and 
Democrats, Figure 2 shows that Democrats were more than five times more likely than 
Republicans were to rally post-September 11. A possible explanation for these results is that 
Democrats had the ability to increase their support level by 74.7%, whereas the Republicans 
only had the ability to increase their support level by 15 .8%. Democrats clearly had a greater 
opportunity to increase their support. Overall, the results from Figure 2 and Table 3 show 
that Democrats rallied more than Republicans did, which offers a strong support for H2. 
4 The test was performed on a confidence interval of 95%; meaning that to indicate significance, the p-value 
should be below .05. 
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Support by Seniority 
As party lines dominate congressional voting choices, Edwards (1976) suggests that 
seniority also affects voting behavior. Edwards finds that freshmen members tend to be more 
inclined to respond to presidential prestige than non-freshmen members, which may affect 
their voting choices. If true, freshmen may be more inclined to increase their support of a 
president after a rally. This study applies Edwards's findings to test this hypothesis: 
H3: Freshmen House members' level of support increases more than non-freshmen 
House members' levels of support following a crisis event. 
Using the data on seniority, the results show that President Bush received a support 
rate of 69.4% from freshmen members and a support rate of 54.8% from non-freshmen 
members before September 11. After September 11, President Bush received a support rate 
of 73.9% from freshmen members and a support rate of 62.5% from non-freshmen members. 
Figure 3 displays the difference in support from pre and post September 11 by seniority. 
Freshmen members increased their support by 4.2% and non-freshmen members increased 
their support by 7.6%. 
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Seniority 
Figure 3 supports the idea that non-freshmen members rallied more than freshmen 
members. However, to prove the significance of these results, at-test was performed on the 
data set. In this analysis, the predictor is the seniority of the House members and the 
response is the difference in voting before and after September 11 . The results of the t-test 
can be seen below in Table 4. 
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Table 4. T -test: President Bush's Support Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 by Seniority 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Sig. (2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
difference of 16.180 .000 
before and Equal .338 56.589 .736 1.15157 3.40442 -5.66673 7.96987 
after 
variances 
not assumed 
The t-test in Table 4 shows the results shown in Figure 3 are not statistically significant. 
Similarly to party, seniority was tested at a 95% confidence interval. The significance level 
ofp< .736 is radically higher than the maximum value p<.05. The p-value shows that the 
error in the analysis is too high to make the results conclusive; there is no conclusive 
correlation between seniority and the amount of change of presidential support in the House 
after September 11. Unlike Edwards (1976) findings, these results suggest that seniority may 
not play an important role in determining levels of presidential support in Congress. 5 
Support by Seat Marginality 
5 In an independent t-test on freshmen members, with support as the dependent variable and party as the independent 
variable, Republican-freshmen members rallied more than Democratic-freshmen members. Republican-freshmen 
members had an average difference in support levels of II points from before and after September II; Democratic-
freshmen members had an average difference in support levels of 4 points from before and after September 11. 
These results show that freshmen members, accounting for party, diverge from the trends of this study on particular 
subgroups more likely to rally . 
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This study suggests that seniority may not be a key determinant in rallying behavior, 
despite Edwards' (1976) suggestion that seniority does affect voting behavior. However, 
Edwards (1976) also suggests that seat marginality can influence congressional voting 
choices. 6 Edwards finds that marginal seat members tend to be more inclined to respond to 
presidential prestige than non-marginal seat members. Thus, marginal seat members may 
tend to increase their support of a president following a crisis more than non-marginal seat 
members. This study applies Edwards's findings to test this hypothesis: 
H4: Marginal seat members' level of support increases more than non-marginal seat 
members' levels of support following a crisis event. 
Using the data on seat marginality, the results show that President Bush received a 
support rate of 63.3% from marginal seat members and a support rate of 53.9% from non-
marginal seat members before September 11. After September 11, President Bush received a 
support rate of70.5% from marginal seat members and a support rate of61.4% from non-
marginal seat members. Figure 4 displays the difference in support from pre and post 
September 11 by seat marginality in the House of Representatives. Marginal seat members 
increased their support by 7.2% and non-marginal seat members increased their support by 
7.5%. 
6 Gross and Garand's (1984) measurement of marginality employed in this study is consistent with Edwards 
(1976) measurement on marginality. 
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Figure 4 shows that members from marginal seats and non-marginal seats had similar 
increases in support; non-marginal seat members only increased their support level by .3% 
more than marginal seat members. This small difference between marginal and non-marginal 
members does not strongly support the hypothesis that seat marginality is a strong predictor 
of the strength of a congressional rally. At-test was performed to further examine these 
results. In this analysis, the predictor is the seat marginality of the House members and the 
response is the difference in voting before and after September 11. The results of the t-test 
can be seen below in Table 5. 
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Table 5. T -test: President Bush's Support Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 by Seat Marginality 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Sig. (2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
difference of Equal .907 .341 .432 442 .666 .67355 1.55924 -2.39089 3.73799 
before and variances 
after assumed 
The t-test shown in Table 5 yields no significance between the two variables. The 
lack of a strong correlation between seat marginality and presidential support levels suggests 
that the increase in support that occurred after September 11 may have been random. The t-
test has both a high level of error and a significance level of p< .666, showing that there is no 
statistical correlation between marginality and presidential support. The results suggest that 
seat marginality may not be a determinant of elite opinion presidential support levels after a 
crisis event, unlike Edwards' (1976) findings. 
Support by Ideology 
Although partisanship and ideology are correlated, the two are not synonymous. Two 
members may identify with the same party, but may have different ideologies. Bond and 
Fleisher (1980) suggest that ideology may act as a determinant of presidential support of 
congressional roll call votes. If true, whether a member identifies as liberal, moderate, or 
conservative, may affect their rally (Poole and Rosenthal 2007). Fleisher and Bond (1 988) 
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and Baum (2003) suggest that Republican presidents experience larger rallies from liberal 
Democrats. Drawing from the scholarly literature, this study suggests that a Republican 
president may receive increased support levels from liberal members after a crisis event. The 
hypothesis on support by ideology is the following: 
H5: Liberal House members' levels of support for Republican president increases 
more than moderate and conservative House members' levels of support following a 
crisis event. 
Using the data on ideology, the results show that President Bush received a support 
rate of 36.7% from liberal members, a support rate of 27.1% from moderate members, and a 
support rate of 87.5% from conservative members before September 11. After September 11 , 
President Bush received a support rate of 51.7% from liberal members, a support rate of 
39.7% from moderate members, and a support rate of 87.8% from conservative members. 
Figure 5 displays the difference in support from pre- and post- September 11 by ideology. 
Liberal members increased their support by 14.9%, moderates by 12.5%, and conservatives 
by 0.3%. 
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Figure 5 shows that members with liberal to moderate ideologies increased their 
support of President Bush significantly more than members with conservative ideologies 
after September 11. At-test was used in order to further examine the statistical significance 
of these results. In this analysis, the predictor is ideology of the House members and the 
response is the difference in voting before and after September 11. The results of the t-test 
can be seen below in Table 6. 
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Table 6. T-test: President Bush's Support Pre 9/11 and Post 9/11 by Ideology 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Sig. (2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
difference of Equal 2.682 .102 8.259 365 .000 11 .57151 1.40114 8.81619 14.32684 
before and variances 
after assumed 
These results show a strong statistical significance from the bar graph in Figure 6 that 
supports H5. The t-test was performed on a confidence interval of 95%. The significance 
level of p< .001 shows a strong level of correlation between ideology and the amount of 
change of presidential support in the House of Representatives after September 11. 
Regarding the difference in support for the president among liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives, Figure 5 shows that liberal members were more than 49 times more likely than 
conservative members to rally post-September 11. Figure 5 also shows that moderate 
members were more than 41 times more likely than conservative members were to rally post-
September 11. A possible explanation for these results is that liberal members had the ability 
to increase their support level by 63.3% and moderate members had the ability to increase 
their support level by 72.9%; conservative members only could increase their support level 
by 12.2%. Liberal and moderate members had a greater opportunity to increase their support 
levels than conservative members. The results show that liberal members and moderate 
members rallied more than conservative members did, which offers strong support for H5 . 
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Multivariate Analysis 
The results from the t-tests show that ideology and party are strongly correlated with 
changes in presidential support levels, whereas the results for seniority and seat marginality 
were inconclusive. The t-tests analyze each of the four predictors individually and show the 
significance of their effect on the response. However, in order to show the correlations 
between the predictors and their response, a multivariate regression is needed; the 
multivariate regression allows for the simultaneous testing of each variable controlling for 
the effects of the other variables. This regression is a statistical test that analyzes each of the 
four predictors together with the same response. It measures each variables outcome on the 
response in relation to the others, thus showing which predictors had the strongest effect on 
the congressional support following the crisis event. The multivariate regression also shows 
the statistical significance of each of the predictors when analyzed with all the variables to 
ensure that the results are conclusive. Table 7 shows the R Square value, which represents 
the proportion of variance in support, which can be explained by the four independent 
variables. The R square of .215 shows that 21.5% of the data points of support can be 
predicted accurately from the independent variables: party affiliation, seniority, seat 
marginality, and ideology. Table 8 shows the multivariate regression of the four subgroups: 
seniority, seat marginality, ideology, and party. 
Table 7. Model Summary: R Square on Support Levels 
Adjusted R Std. Error of the 
Model R R Square Square Estimate 
1 .464a .215 .208 12.61284 
a. Predictors: (Constant), party code 100=dem, 200=rep, 328=ind, 
marginal, seniority, ideology 
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Table 8. Multivariate Regression on Seniority, Seat Marginality, Ideology, and Party 
Standardized 
Unstandardized Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 42.602 7.775 5.479 .000 
seniority -3.792 1.927 -.088 -1.968 .050 
marginal -.587 1.472 -.018 -.398 .690 
ideology -3.553 1.434 -.187 -2.478 .014 
party -.086 .021 -.302 -4.006 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: difference of before and after 
The variables, or the predictors, tested in the multi-variable regression are seniority, 
seat marginality, ideology, and party. The regression uses each of the four predictors to form 
an equation known as a regression model. The regression model is an equation that relates 
the response, the difference between presidential support levels from before and after 
September 11, to the four predictors in the regression. 
The value labeled "constant" depicts the error induced in the regression model. Due to 
this error, the individual unstandardized coefficients do not show conclusive results. 
Additional errors are those of the four individual predictors shown in the column titled "std 
error." These errors must be accounted for in order to examine the coefficients; the 
standardized coefficient column accounts for these errors. 
The standardized coefficients show the predictors that have the strongest correlation 
to the response, or the difference of support from before and after September 11. Party is the 
strongest predictor of the four with a standardized coefficient of -.302. The next strongest 
predictor is ideology with -.187, then seniority with -.088, and lastly marginality with -.018. 
These results show that party lines affect the response the most. It also shows that the effect 
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of seniority and marginality on the strength of the congressional response to a crisis event is 
almost negligible. To check the significance of these results, the regression shows the p-
values for each of the coefficients. These values represent the data analyzed using the 
traditional 95% confidence interval. The variables must have a p-value less than or equal 
to .05 to be statistically significant in relation to the response. 
The p-values of both party code and ideology easily fall in this acceptable range. 
Seniority has a significance level of exactly p< .05, showing that the results are not 
conclusive. However, these results are generally accepted to be significant. These results 
from the multivariate regression are different from the t-test results, which show that there is 
no conclusive correlation between seniority and the amount of change of presidential support 
in the House after September 11. The multivariate regression shows that seniority is 
significant because it takes into account the correlations between all of the variables; the t-
test only takes into account the one variable of seniority. Marginality has a significance level 
of p<.690, showing that it is not a conclusive or significant predictor on the response. 
The regression model in Table 8 corroborates the results found from the t-tests on 
each variable. The values labeled "standardized coefficients" are used in order to examine 
each variable individually: the error inherent to each one must be minimized. These values 
would be obtained if all of the variables in the regression were standardized before actually 
running the regression. By standardizing the variables before running the regression, all of 
the variables that were on different scales are put on the same scale, where it becomes 
possible to compare the magnitude of the coefficients to see which ones have more of an 
effect. 
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By examining these coefficients, the model shows that party and ideology are the 
two major predictors on the strength of the rally effect in Congress. Additionally, the model 
shows that seniority has a slight effect on the strength of the rally in Congress. Lastly, the 
model shows that marginality does not strongly affect the difference in support levels from 
before and after September 11 in the House. 
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Conclusion 
The findings of this study suggest that party and ideology are key determinants in the 
difference of presidential support following a crisis event. In the case of September 11, 
Democratic members, liberal members, and moderate members of the House of 
Representatives rallied behind President Bush the most, exhibited by their significantly 
increased support levels. These findings are consistent with Fleisher and Bond's (1988) and 
Baum's (2003) studies on rallies, which suggest liberal Democratic members of Congress are 
more likely to increase their support levels for a Republican president. The findings are also 
consistent with Edwards's (1976) suggestion that party is positively correlated with 
presidential prestige. 
The study also suggests that seniority is a determinant in the difference of presidential 
support following a crisis event, but only when accounting for party and ideology. However, 
the findings from the study do not support Edwards's (1976) findings that members from 
non-marginal seats respond positively to presidential prestige. To an extent, this study 
provides some support to the scholarly literature concerning the correlation in Congress and 
presidential support during normal times. 
On the other hand, this study is not congruent with Edwards and Swenson's (1997) 
suggestion on who rallies at the mass opinion level. This study suggests that the subgroups at 
the elite opinion level that are most likely to rally are the ones with the highest thresholds to 
overcome in approval, meaning that liberal and Democratic members are more likely to rally 
in a case with a Republican president. Moreover, a possible explanation for the varying 
results between Edwards and Swenson's findings and this study's findings are the varying 
scopes of the rallies measured. The rally following September 11 was much more extensive 
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( 
than the rally that Edwards and Swenson observed. Although this study only examines a case 
with a Republican president, the results may suggest that conservative and Republican 
members are more likely to rally in a case with a Democratic president; only additional 
studies will be able to conclusively demonstrate this pattern. 
Although the study is inconsistent with the literature on who rallies, it implies that the 
rally effect that Mueller (1970) identifies to occur in the masses also occurs in the elite. More 
specifically, the study suggests that rallies are more likely to occur in particular 
congressional subgroups. These findings are important in understanding the nature of the 
executive-legislative branch interaction, particularly following a crisis. Support levels for 
President Bush did increase after September 11, suggesting that the president does have an 
increased likelihood to achieve policy success in the House following a crisis. The study 
finds that rallies do occur at the elite opinion level, especially within particular subgroups; 
the findings suggest that the president has a temporary allotment of time where his policies 
have a higher probability of approval. 
Despite the study's findings and predictions on rallies in the House, the results may 
be atypical due to the study's examination of only one rally effect. However, the results 
suggest a potentially useful avenue for future research into the executive-legislative 
relationship. Further studies on rallies at the elite level may produce more conclusive results 
concerning the tendencies of support levels in Congress following large-scale crises. 
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